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INTRODUCTION
The specter of avian influenza H5N1
has raised concerns globally and brought
back memories of the feared 1918 influen-
za pandemic. Concerns about a newly
mutated strain of avian influenza virus,
with the capacity to become a pandemic
organism with high morbidity and mortal-
ity, has spurred pandemic influenza plans
at all levels of the public and private sec-
tors across the globe. The World Health
Organization is playing a central role in
coordinating the development of plans and
in urging member states to coordinate pan-
demic planning. Attendant to this rush to
create pandemic plans is intense public
scrutiny, including anxiety and fear. Media
attention has been intense and has
increased public worries about the avail-
ability of antiviral medications with indi-
viduals rushing to secure their own stock
of antiviral medication. Nation states are
taking actions to protect themselves and
secure their borders from the incursion of
avian influenza transmitted through bird
species.
If one reflects on the roots of the term
“pandemic” and engages in a little word
play and deletes the “dem” from pandemic,
the result is “panic,” which is close to what
we are verging on at this current time in our
public fear of pandemic influenza.
However, when one takes the “dem” out of
pandemic (which represents the Greek word
of “demos” or “people”), it becomes impor-
tant that we try to re-insert some of the bet-
ter aspects of human nature such as reason
and reflection in our preparation. If there is
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Toronto, Ontario, Canadaany reason to include ethics in pandemic
planning, it would be for the following con-
siderations: How we respond to a pandemic
strainofinfluenzavirus,howwemartialour
social resources, how we work collabora-
tively, and how we treat people who are
infected or pose a risk of infection to others
is a reflection of our own humanity. The
measure by which we can say our response
to pandemic influenza is a humane and eth-
ical one will be judged and interpreted in
light of the policies, prescriptions, and man-
agement plans that are put in place. We can
be certain that all actions will be evaluated
in light of our response.
It is my contention that ethics has a
central role in pandemic influenza plan-
ning, and pandemic influenza plans in all
jurisdictions should reflect deeply on the
ethical issues raised by pandemic influenza.
In this essay, I will outline the SARS out-
break inToronto and the lessons we learned
from SARS relating to ethics and infectious
disease outbreaks. I will discuss the devel-
opment of an ethical framework for pan-
demic planning that was developed by an
interdisciplinary team of scholars at the
Joint Centre for Bioethics at the University
of Toronto and adopted by the province of
Ontario’s pandemic influenza plan.
SARS IN TORONTO
The SARS virus struck Toronto in the
late winter of 2003. The index case was
identified on the 23rd of February, and the
outbreak was officially considered over by
mid-June 2003. For the four months that
SARS was present in Toronto, the social
and economic impacts were remarkable.
The impact on the health care system was
also unprecedented, resulting in the virtual
closure of many large tertiary-care hospi-
tals, the foregoing of services to non-
SARS patients, the implementation of
stringent infection control measures with-
in hospitals, and the marked alteration of
the usual practice and operation of health
care facilities [1] .
SARS also put a tremendous strain on
an under-resourced public health system.
Several thousand Ontarians were placed in
quarantine, requiring monitoring and sup-
port. There was an unprecedented need for
contact tracing and outbreak investigation,
requiring immense human resources being
directed toward the control of the pandem-
ic [2].
The SARS experience taught us that
the health care system was singularly
unprepared for an outbreak of a respirato-
ry pathogen of any magnitude. Although
there are similarities between SARS and
pandemic influenza, there are similarly
important differences. At the outset of
SARS, the organism was uncharacterized.
It was known to be a communicable agent
and transmitted via respiratory secretions,
but which specific virus and many of the
important viral characteristics required for
the rational management of the outbreak
were unknown. How long was the incuba-
tion period? Could people shed the virus
asymptomatically? Was immunity present
after infection? However, even with the
use of known parameters of disease con-
trol there will still be serious uncertainties
on the optimal management of a pandem-
ic influenza outbreak.
Another important consideration in
SARS was its disproportionate impact on
health care workers.Approximately 40 per-
cent of probable cases in the Toronto out-
break were health care workers. Two nurs-
es and one physician died in Toronto as a
result of their infections. Many of those
who were infected are still on disability or
not at full health, even two years after the
outbreak. Hundreds of health care workers
were put in work quarantine. The psycho-
logical and psychosocial impact of SARS
on health care workers was substantial. In a
survey conducted by our unit, 45 percent of
nurses scored above the General Health
Questionnaire 12 cut-off point for psycho-
logical stress. Sixty-five percent of respon-
dents reported SARS-related concerns for
personal or family health. Many respon-
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were intrusive and detracted from the qual-
ity of their work. In the aftermath of SARS,
many health care providers recognized that
the amount of risk imposed by the SARS
outbreak was greater than they were willing
to countenance and subsequently pursued
alternative employment [3].
RESPONSE TO THE ETHICAL
ISSUES RAISED BY SARS:
THE JCB WORKING GROUP
While the SARS outbreak was ongo-
ing, a group of colleagues associated with
the Joint Centre for Bioethics (JCB) at the
University of Toronto formed a working
group to reflect on some of the ethical
issues raised by SARS. Five key issues
were identified. A framework was created
and proposed for analysis of issues and as a
decision aid. Our report was submitted to
and included in the Naylor Commission [4]
and subsequently published in the British
Medical Journal [5]. Our report identified
five key issues:
1)Health care workers’ duty to care,
and the duty of institutions to sup-
port them;
2) Naming names and naming commu-
nities, privacy of personal informa-
tion, and the public need to know;
3)Organizational issues: priority set-
ting;
4)When public health trumps civil lib-
erties, the ethics of quarantine; and
5)SARS in a globalized world.
Additional issues related to infectious
disease outbreaks arise within the purview
of research ethics. These, however, I will
not discuss in any detail.
HEALTH CARE WORKERS’ DUTY
TO CARE AND THE DUTY OF
INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPORT THEM
On the surface, health care workers’
response toSARS was impressiveandhero-
ic. However, some health care workers
refused to work and in the aftermath of
SARS have expressed concerns about
exposing themselves and their families to
risks from communicable diseases. With
respect to the duty to care, several important
lessons were learned. It is important to note
that health care professionals have a duty to
care for the sick and for themselves. They
have a duty not to harm others by commu-
nicating disease. However, the limit to per-
sonal risk is unclear. More importantly,
there are silences within current codes of
ethics with respect to giving direction to
health care workers regarding the extent to
which they are obligated to put themselves
at risk in caring for individuals with com-
municable diseases.
From the SARS outbreak, we also
learned that institutions have a reciprocal
duty to support and protect health care
workers and to help them cope with very
stressful situations. Institutions and organi-
zations have an obligation to set clear
expectations of employees, and there needs
to be recognition of the potential risk run by
individuals [6].
NAMING NAMES AND NAMING
COMMUNITIES, PRIVACY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION, AND
THE PUBLIC NEED TO KNOW
The control of health information and
the privacy of information was an issue in
the SARS outbreak. There was an avid
appetite on behalf of the public to know
where the disease was manifesting itself,
including demands for identification of
particular individuals who may have
posed risks to the public. For example, Dr.
Sheela Basur, the medical officer of health
for the city of Toronto, released the name
of the index case to the public. It was
believed necessary to serve disease con-
trol, as she had contacted many people
while ill, died from what was believed to
be cardiac disease, and many had been at
her funeral and in contact with family
members who by that time were sympto-
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ed that a nurse who worked at a hospital
with SARS patients had used mass transit
while febrile. In this case, public health
authorities resisted pressure to provide
identifying information as it served no
legitimate public health goal.
In this context, we learned that the pub-
lic health officials do have the right to over-
ride an individual’s right to privacy in cases
in which serious public health risks exist.
Private medical information can be released
to the public in situations that would help
protect the public health or facilitate the
conduct of an outbreak investigation and no
alternative legitimate means exist to attain
this goal [4]. However, privacy and confi-
dentiality of individuals should be protect-
ed, unless a well-defined public health goal
can be achieved by the release of this infor-
mation to the general public and when there
are no other means of achieving this end.
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES:
PRIORITY SETTING
In terms of organizational issues, the
important lessons learned were that con-
trol of the spread of disease is important
and a primary goal of the public health
system. However, as much attention must
be paid to the needs of non-infected
patients requiring urgent medical care; that
is, the need for delivery of cancer services,
cardiovascular services, and general pri-
mary care should be provided or there
should be means of providing such care.
Health planning and actually the design of
institutions may need to reflect this.
A study of hospital priority setting
following SARS identified the following
four key issues:
1)Patients and families did not have
access to the reasons for many deci-
sions, including the visitation policy
and ramp up of clinical activities
after the outbreak was over.
2)A formal revision/appeals mecha-
nism could help improve the quality
of decision making and alleviate the
unfair reliance on the “squeaky
wheel” phenomenon.
3)Operating room time was allocated
by division, rather than by patient
need, and these decisions should be
discussed more fully.
4)Institutional leaders should maintain
two-way contact with front line staff
who are implementing priority set-
ting decisions — this will provide
support and enhance accountability
for decision making by staff. [7]
There is also a need for accountability
for making decisions, and transparency
and fairness must be respected. There is a
need also to communicate accurate infor-
mation to the public, including the risks
and benefits of strategies and decisions.
THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE
MEASURES FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
The imposition of mass quarantine
during SARS for the first time in modern
history raised important ethical issues, and
there were several lessons learned. For the
Canadian public, it was recognized that
the interests of protecting the public health
overrode some individual rights such as
the freedom of movement. However, it
was also recognized that when society
imposes a duty on individuals to restrict
their actions for the benefit of others, par-
ticularly for the benefit of public health,
public health officials and society have a
general duty to inform the individuals of
the situation and to explain the reasons for
the limitations of their freedoms.
However, there is an important reciprocal
duty to do as much as much as possible to
assist the people whose rights are being
infringed. This placed an onus on public
health authorities to ensure that those
quarantined had access to food, medica-
tion, and were psychologically and finan-
cially supported. The government of
Ontario ensured workplace accommoda-
tion and income protection for those quar-
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believed that they were acting on the basis
of performing a key civic duty.
We believe that the Siracusa princi-
ples are of value in illuminating these
issues. In the Siracusa principles, public
health may be invoked as a ground for lim-
iting certain rights in order to allow the
state to take measures dealing with a seri-
ous threat to the health of the population or
individual members of the population.
These measures must be specifically
aimed at preventing disease or injury or
providing care of the sick and injured.
Within the Siracusa principles are a set of
inviolable rights:
…no party shall even in time of emergency
threatening the life of the nation derogate
from the covenant guarantees of the right to
life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and from
medical or scientific experimentation without
free consent, freedom from slavery or invol-
untary servitude, the right not to be impris-
oned for contractual debt, the right not to be
convicted or sentenced to a heavier penalty
by virtue of retroactive criminal legislation,
the right to recognition as a person before the
law, and freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. These rights are not derogable under
any conditions, even for the asserted purpose
of preserving the life of the nation [8].
It is important to emphasize the last
clause, “even for the asserted purpose of
preserving the life of the nation.” These
non-derogable rights seem in some way to
be a bedrock core of individual rights. The
clause “and from medical and scientific
experimentation without free consent” is
also important, particularly for a future
pandemic, because the use of a newly
developed vaccine or the massive use of
antivirals for the control of the disease
would in some ways be an experiment.
How one would secure consent freely in
such exigent circumstances is an impor-
tant issue requiring scholarly attention.
Freedom of thought, conscience, and reli-
gion is also important and speaks to the
role of mandatory treatment orders and
mandatory vaccination orders. Those who
by conscience or thought assert the free-
dom not to be vaccinated may have a case
grounded in human rights doctrine.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
One of the important issues that we
learned from SARS that is directly rele-
vant to pandemic influenza is that we live
in a globalized world. Many have noted
that SARS was a wake-up call about glob-
al interdependence and increasingly rapid
spread of infectious diseases. We think it
also reinforces the fact that health is a
global public good, and, therefore, there is
a need to strengthen the global health sys-
tem to cope with infectious diseases. This
argument could be made on the grounds of
enlightened self interest or of mutual
regard. The outcome is the same either
way. Cooperation globally will enhance
everyone’s security and reduce the spread
of disease morbidity and mortality. When
one invokes cooperation, we can use argu-
ments of global solidarity to secure actions
from nation states for global public health
goods.
However, we also learned from SARS
that transparency of communication also
comes with economic and social costs.
Toronto, which is relatively transparent in
its reporting of disease status, suffered eco-
nomically from cancellation of conferences,
and general tourism fell off dramatically
despite the fact that the probability of expo-
sure to SARS outside the hospital environ-
ment was negligible. How we as a global
culture will act so as to not disadvantage
those unfortunately afflicted by a major
infectious disease outbreak, again speaks to
our humanity in a globalized world.
The newly drafted International
Health Regulations promise to be an
improvement on the antiquated structure
of international disease control but still
face challenges in implementation and
agreement among member states. [9]
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PANDEMIC PLANNING
The SARS experience and our reflec-
tions from the perspective of ethics prepared
us to participate in pandemic influenza plan-
ning. One hospital invited its ethicist to par-
ticipate in the local pandemic planning
process.Itwasrecognizedthatresourceallo-
cation issues featured prominently in pan-
demic planning, specifically access to scarce
technology such as respirators and intensive
care units. There was also a need to have
equitable and fair human resource planning.
After an ethics component was added to a
draft hospital pandemic plan, the Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care of the Province
of Ontario invited the Joint Centre for
Bioethics working group to join its pandem-
ic planning process around issues of how to
allocate vaccines and antiviral medications.
As a consequence, the ethical framework
that the group developed was adopted and
included in the provincial plan [10].
The WHO has recommended atten-
tion to ethical issues in pandemic plan-
ning, but to our knowledge, we are
unaware of any developed frameworks
[11]. Indeed, there has been criticism pub-
lished about the lack of ethical reflection
in major pandemic plans [12].
The elements of the ethical frame-
work for pandemic planning focused both
on the decision-making process and the
values in forming the process. There was
an emphasis on inclusiveness, account-
ability, and transparency, which has been
adapted and modified from current theory
and priority setting, specifically Daniels
and Sabin’s accountability for reasonable-
ness model [13].
Our model focuses on procedural val-
ues and substantive values. In terms of
procedural values, the process of planning
should be open and transparent, reason-
able, inclusive, responsive, and account-
able. In other words, it is important that
decisions made in pandemic planning, par-
ticularly in a publicly funded health care
system, meet these criteria. Of note, we
believe strongly that there should be
opportunities to revisit and revise deci-
sions as new information emerges
throughout the crisis, as well as mecha-
nisms to address disputes and complaints.
Substantively, we believe the pan-
demic plan must be guided by values of
preserving individual liberty, but recogniz-
ing its limitations and recognizing that
when restrictions to individual liberty are
in place, they should be proportional, nec-
essary and relevant, employ the least
restrictive means to achieve the public
health goal, and be applied without dis-
crimination. We recognize the pre-eminent
need of the public health system to protect
the public from harm, but actions taken
should be proportional to the threat and
risk. Privacy should be respected but may
be overridden to protect the public from
harm. Equity is an important value in that
all patients have an equal claim to receive
the health care they need under normal cir-
cumstances. Provisions should be made as
much as possible to provide these services;
however, during a pandemic, some health
services, such as elective surgery, may
need to be deferred. Steps must be made
and plans put in place to address these
issues when the crisis is over.
One of the most important issues to be
resolved is the duty of health care
providers to provide care during times of
infectious disease emergencies. Although
many ethical codes speak to the duty to
provide care and respond to suffering, we
recognize that health care providers are
humans and have to weigh demands from
both their professional role as well as other
competing obligations to their own health,
to their family, and to their colleagues. We
do also recognize that there will be an
important need for institutions to reinforce
their commitment to the best possible pro-
tection for those health care workers who
are exposed to risk.
We recognize reciprocity as an impor-
tant concept in the management of and
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Reciprocity requires that society support
those who face a disproportionate burden
in protecting the public good and take
steps to minimize burdens as far as possi-
ble. Reciprocity also requires that society
ensure that those affected receive adequate
care and do not suffer unfair economic
penalties. If leaders expect people exposed
to or suffering from communicable dis-
eases to act in a manner that does not put
others at risk, it is important that they cre-
ate a social environment that does not
leave people without supports. Measures
to protect the public good are likely to
impose a disproportionate burden on
health care workers, patients, and their
families. A more detailed account of the
framework with illustrative examples has
recently been published [14].
Infectious diseases underscore our
mutual vulnerability.As Francis et al. have
recently written, infectious diseases
change our vision of agency because indi-
viduals are both vectors and potential vic-
tims [15]. This inherent relationality
between individuals leads us to the notion
of reciprocal caring for discharging our
obligations and assisting those who are ill.
This is also linked to the concept of soli-
darity. The solidarity is both within health
care institutions, between health care insti-
tutions, and also for more distant support
to our colleagues in the developing world.
Underlying the pandemic influenza
plan is the need to enhance trust. Trust is
an essential component of the relation-
ships between clinician and patient, staff
and the organization, between health care
providers and organizations, and between
organizations within a health system, as
well as between municipalities, provinces,
states, and nation states.
Decision makers will be confronted
with the challenge of maintaining stake-
holder trust while simultaneously imple-
menting various control measures. It takes
time to build trust, and our belief is that the
more inclusive the pandemic planning
process, the more trust there will be in the
process that is agreed upon. As the pan-
demic is likely to occur in our lifetimes,
according to the best expert opinion, it is
important that planners should be involved
in trust-building exercises earlier in the
pre-pandemic phase rather than later in the
crisis. Entrustment exercises are difficult
to schedule when stretchers are filling the
halls of emergency departments.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, ethical considerations
are essential to pandemic influenza plan-
ning. To my reasoning, these are intrinsic
elements to the process, rather than simply
desirable or superfluous. Our group
believes that the principles outlined in the
framework will help enhance the legitima-
cy of any public health response in pan-
demic influenza planning, particularly in
democratic societies. The proof of the
value of these principles, of course, will
only be known after the pandemic rather
than before its occurrence. However, there
is time now for all planners to pay atten-
tion to the ethical dimensions of pandemic
influenza planning and to include such
considerations into their planning.
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